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JURISDICTION 
This case is an appeal from a Judgment and Commitment issued by the Third 
District Court for Summit County, State of Utah. This court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err when it refused to suppress the evidence of defendant's 
intoxication when the evidence supporting the charge of driving while intoxicated was 
only obtained after the arresting officer: 
a) entered the defendant's private patio to peer through a window that 
could not be viewed from any public walkway or place; and 
b) ordered the defendant to come to the patio's sliding glass door, where 
the officer to observe his "glassy eyes" and "odor of alcohol." 
In reaching its erroneous determination not to suppress the evidence obtained after 
this illegal incursion and detention, the trial court failed to apply the correct law to the 
facts of the case. The denial of a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed for 
correctness, without deference to the trial court's decision. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 
If 15; State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App. 388, \ 12. 
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Preservation of Issues on Appeal. The trial court issued its Judgment and 
Commitment on October 20, 2007. (Addendum;CTl98-200). Perkins timely filed his 
notice of appeal with the Third District Court, Summit County, on November 18, 2007. 
(CT:200-3). 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The constitutional provision applicable to the issues in this case is the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, which reads in its 
entirety: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case commenced with the arrest of the defendant, Travis Perkins, on 
December 12, 2007. The arrest occurred after 4 a.m., based on evidence obtained by a 
police officer who had identified the defendant through a sliding glass door that could 
only be viewed from a private patio at the rear of the defendant's condominium. 
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Following the arrest, an information was issued on December 13, 2008 charging the 
defendant with driving under the influence, a third degree felony. 
A preliminary hearing was held on February 12, 2008, after which the defendant 
was bound over for trial. On March 10, 2008, defendant made a motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained by the police through the illegal search and detention of the defendant. 
(CT:26-37). An evidentiary hearing was held on March 31, 2008. (All "RT" references 
herein are to the Reporter's Transcript of the evidentiary hearing). 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court permitted the parties to file 
additional memoranda. The state filed its opposition to the motion to suppress on April 
16, 2008. (CT:48-66). The defendant filed a reply on April 28, 2008 (CT:71-79) and 
oral argument was held on that same day, after which the trial court took the matter under 
advisement. 
On May 1, 2008, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision denying the 
motion to suppress. (Addendum; CT:81-9).After a trial by jury during which the State 
relied upon the illegally obtained evidence, the defendant was found guilty of the third 
degree felony of driving under the influence. On October 20, 2008, the trial court issued 
its Judgment and Commitment, sentencing the defendant to be confined at the Utah State 
Prison for a period of zero to five years and fining him $3,000, plus an 85% surcharge. 
(Addendum). This appeal followed. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The events giving rise to this appeal occurred in the early hours between 3:30 and 
4:30 a.m. on December 12, 2007. (RT:30:14-20). In those early morning hours, a Deer 
Valley security guard (Muller) called the Park City Police Department to report that he 
had seen a driver who was apparently stuck, attempting to maneuver his vehicle1 out of 
the snow by the side of the road. (RT: 11:7-15) Muller spoke with the driver who, in 
Muller's opinion may have been intoxicated, but gave no particular or specific 
information to support that conclusion. (RT: 11:4-6). Muller called 911 and asked for 
the assistance of the police. (RT:11-12). 
After Muller called the police, the driver of the car left his vehicle and headed 
toward a nearby parking structure and condominium complex. (RT: 14). The police 
officer (Lealaitafea) arrived and spoke with Muller, who described the driver and pointed 
in the direction he had been walking. (RT: 16). The trial court ruled that the information 
that Muller gave to the police officer "did not amount to reasonable suspicion to detain 
defendant." Memorandum Decision, f^ 3, p. 5. (CT:85). 
Heading off in the direction indicated by Muller, Lealaitafea noticed some 
footprints in the snow. (RT:33:10-12). He did not know who had made the footprints, but 
1
 Muller testified at the evidentiary hearing that the individual he saw, and about whom he 
made the 911 call, was driving a Ford. (RT:7:5-6). When questioned by the police, however, the 
defendant said that he was driving a Subaru station wagon. (RT:38:20-21). 
4 
he followed them anyway. (RT:49-16-20). The path of the footprints took him away 
from the shoveled stairs and common pathway that led to defendant's front door, into deep 
snow and up a hill to the rear of the defendant's condominium unit, which sat on a bluff 
above common pathway. (RT:48:10-13; RT:49:3-5). After climbing uphill through 
unshovelled snow, the officer arrived at the rear patio and sliding glass door of the 
defendant's condo. The curtain to the door was open, but the officer could not see the 
defendant until he had completed his uphill slog and was standing on the patio. 
(RT:50:12-15). 
When Lealaitafea approached the window, he looked inside and saw a man dressed 
only in boxer shorts and his socks. (RT:51:20-21). The officer began rapping on the 
window and made eye contact with the man inside the condominium. (RT:37). Initially, 
the man did not come to the door but instead tried to hide by crouching down behind his 
bed. Id. The officer did not leave, however, nor did he call out that he just wanted to 
ask a few questions. Instead, he gestured to the man and ordered him to "Come and talk to 
me." (RT:39:4-12). Only after the officer issued this command did defendant stand up 
from his hiding place and open the door. (RT:39:13-16). It was not until after the 
defendant opened the sliding glass door that Lealaitafea was able to note the "odor of 
alcohol" on which the officer based his further decision to ask the defendant to get 
dressed, step outside and submit to a field sobriety test. (RT:40:8-16; RT:41:9-15; RT:43). 
When the defendant failed the test, he was arrested and charged with the third degree 
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felony of driving under the influence. (RT:43). 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress "any and all evidence acquired by the 
State" on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to detain the defendant without the 
evidence obtained by Officer Lealaitafea after through the defendant's sliding glass door, 
after ordering him to "come and talk." The motion was denied. Based upon the 
evidence obtained through the illegal search and seizure, the defendant was convicted of 
the third degree felony of driving under the influence. This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When the police officer left the common pathway to wade through unplowed snow, 
up a hill to the private patio of defendant's condominium, he did so without a warrant. 
Defendant's private patio constituted the "curtilage" of defendant's home and under the 
United States Supreme Court case of United States v. Dunn, is entitled to the same Fourth 
Amendment protection as the defendant's home itself. 
From his position on the patio, the police officer was able for the first time to view 
the defendant through the sliding glass door. The defendant attempted to avoid talking to 
the officer by crouching down behind his bed, but when the officer rapped on the window 
again and commanded the defendant to "come and talk to me," the defendant answered the 
door. By demanding that the defendant open the door, the officer escalated what might 
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have otherwise been a voluntary encounter to a "level two" detention, likewise without a 
warrant and without a reasonable suspicion to detain defendant. 
Under applicable state and federal law, either of these two unauthorized acts 
constituted an impermissible violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable search and seizure. Taken together, they compel the conclusion that the 
evidence of defendant's intoxication was illegally obtained and must be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was based on an improper 
interpretation of the law that applies to the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his own home and the immediately surrounding area of the home, or the "curtilage." 
The correct application of the law establishes that the officer's unwarranted incursion 
upon the curtilage was an unauthorized invasion of defendant's right to privacy and his 
subsequent detention was a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be safe from 
unauthorized searches and seizures. The court also incorrectly applied the law with 
respect to the determination of whether the defendant's opening of the sliding glass door 
was "voluntary." 
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Because the trial court's analysis of defendant's privacy rights was based on an 
incorrect interpretation of the law, the decision to deny the motion to suppress should be 
review de novo. Such a review compels the conclusion that the trial court's refusal to 
suppress the evidence was wrong, and should be reversed. Without the illegally obtained 
evidence, there was no basis for either the charge, or the conviction on the charge, of 
driving under the influence. Accordingly, the verdict should be set aside. 
ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court Erred When It Denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence 
Obtained By Invading Defendant's Private Space and Compelling Him Open a 
Locked Door to Answer Questions 
A. The Arresting Officer's Warrantless Incursion Onto 
Defendant's Back Patio Was A Violation of Defendant's Fourth 
Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure 
It is beyond dispute that a person has a constitutionally protected right to privacy 
and is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections in his own home. Lewis 
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427 (1966); State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 
1056, 1058 (Ut.App. 1992). This protection also extends to the "curtilage55 of the house -
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namely the areas surrounding the house that are sufficiently attached or connected to the 
home as to entitle them to the same protections. 
Whether an area that is not within the house itself falls within the constitutionally 
protected curtilage was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the seminal 
decision of United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987). It is this case that set forth 
the standards which must be used to determine whether a particular area falls within the 
constitutionally protection afforded to the home itself. The trial court failed to apply 
these factors to its decision that the back patio was a "public" area; proper application of 
the factors compels the conclusion that the patio (which was the only vantage point from 
which the officer could see into defendant's home) does, in fact, fall within a 
constitutionally protected area. 
The four factors that Dunn requires a court to analyze in determining this issue are: 
1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home; 2) whether the area is 
included within an enclosure surrounding the home; 3) the nature of the uses to which the 
area is put; and 4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by 
people passing by. Dunn, at 300. 
The trial court in this case considered none of these factors. In this case, the trial 
court found that the patio was public because there were "no visible paths, markings, signs 
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or anything else that forbade Lealaitafea from approaching the sliding glass door."2 In 
reaching this decision the Court misconstrued what is required under Dunn for an area to 
be considered private, and therefore part of the home's protected curtilage. 
The question under Dunn is not whether the police officer was physically barred 
from entering a given space, but rather whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy with respect to the given location. A person is not required, as a condition of 
maintaining his privacy, to construct barriers around his house to keep people out if 
application of the Dunn factors supports the conclusion that the area in question was one 
that the defendant reasonably expected would be considered private. 
An analysis of the four Dunn factors to the facts of this case shows that the patio 
area from which Lealaitafea was first able to see the defendant does, in fact, fall within the 
constitutionally protected "curtilage" of defendant's home. 
1. The Area Is Immediately Adjacent to the Home 
The first Dunn factor requires the court to consider "the proximity of the area 
claimed to be curtilage to the house." In this case, the area in question is immediately 
adjacent to the defendant's home/condo. The only thing separating the patio area from 
the house is a sliding glass window. The close proximity of the patio area to the home 
2
 Part of this finding - that there were no visible paths to the door - actually 
supports the conclusion that the door, and the area adjacent to the door, were intended 
to be private. 
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satisfies the first of the Dunn factors to support a finding that the area is within the home's 
curtilage. 
2. The Area Is Included Within An "Enclosure" Defined 
by the Natural Terrain Surrounding the Condo Unit 
The second Dunn factor is whether the area is included within an "enclosure" 
surrounding the home. The trial court concluded that because there was no fence 
enclosing the area and no markings or signs forbidding access to the area, that it was 
therefore open and public. This is not, however, the appropriate legal standard for 
analyzing whether the area in question is "enclosed" within the meaning of Dunn. 
As one court has observed: 
[Rjeading the word 'enclosure' in Dunn to require an artificial 
barrier seems unduly narrow. The boxwood hedge and heavy 
woods created a natural enclosure around the home and yard; 
requiring a person to expend resources and sacrifice aesthetics 
by building a fence in order to obtain protection from 
unreasonable searches is not required by the constitution. 
Williams v. Garrett, 722 F. Supp. 254, 260-1 (W.D. Va. 1989). See also, United States v. 
Reilly, 76 F.3d. 1271, 1277-8 (finding that an area that was bordered in part by 
"hedgerows along the east and west sides, and by thick woods on the north side" satisfied 
the requirements of an enclosure."). 
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In this case, an application of this legal test to the facts of this case shows that, like 
the areas in question in Williams and Reilly, the defendant's patio was "enclosed" by the 
natural terrain surrounding the condo complex. The condo complex itself is located on a 
bluff above the parking garage and common stairs and pathway. The sliding glass door 
was not the main access to the defendant's condo; the front door can be reached by a 
public pathway, but there was no path to the patio. The officer admitted that the patio 
door was not visible from the public pathway and that it was only after leaving the public 
pathway and slogging up a hill through unplowed snow that he was able to access the patio 
and peer through sliding glass door. 
As in Williams, defendant here is not required to block his view and incur the 
expense of erecting a fence in order to protect his privacy, when the uncontroverted 
evidence is that no one can see in through the window - and his privacy remains 
sacrosanct - unless they first take a non-public, unmarked, unplowed uphill hike to the 
patio. The trial court's conclusion that the area must be public because there were no 
visible "keep out" signs fails to properly apply the Dunn factor of to determine whether the 
area in question is de facto, enclosed by virtue of the surrounding terrain and whether the 




The third factor in the Dunn analysis is the use to which the area is put by the 
resident. There was little evidence of use of this space, other than its general 
inaccessibility and the fact that, unlike the front door which is accessed via a public path, 
the rear patio can be accessed only through the condo or by taking a non-public route up a 
hill. There was no evidence that the area behind and immediately adjacent to the 
defendant's condo was part of the condo public area, or that the space was generally used 
by, or even accessible to, the public. Accordingly, the application of this third Dunn 
factor also supports the conclusion that the patio and sliding glass door were within the 
protected curtilage of the defendant's residence. 
4. Steps Taken By the Defendant to Protect His Privacy 
The fourth Dunn factor that must be considered is the "steps taken by the resident to 
protect his privacy." The analysis of this factor again supports the conclusion that the 
patio and window should be considered "private." 
The uncontroverted evidence is that the terrain surrounding the condo makes it 
impossible to even see the patio or the window, much less look through the window to see 
the interior of the condo, from any public walkway or path. Again, as the court held in 
Williams, a resident does not need to erect a fence, or even pull curtains, to protect his 
privacy when in fact it is impossible to see into the space in question without 
bushwhacking uphill through non-public condo areas. 
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Taken collectively, the Dunn factors compel the conclusion that the defendant's 
patio and sliding glass door are part of the protected curtilage of his home. He had no 
reason to believe that an invited visitor would ever approach his condominium in that 
fashion, or that anyone other than he would use, occupy or transition that space without his 
consent. The trial court failed to properly apply the Dunn factors to the facts and reached 
the wrong result. 
The unwarranted incursion into the private area of defendant's property renders 
inadmissible everything discovered as a result of the incursion. Sun Wong, Rieck. The 
trial court's misapplication of the law on this point compels the reversal of the trial court's 
denial of the motion to suppress. 
B. The Arresting Officer's Detention of Defendant After The Illegal 
Incursion Was A Violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment 
Right Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure 
After slogging through knee-deep snow and up a steep hill to peer into defendant's 
sliding glass patio door, the police officer was first able to see into the defendant's home. 
The officer made eye contact with the defendant, who then attempted to hide behind a bed. 
The officer commanded the defendant to come to the door to answer questions, a 
command that the defendant was not, under the circumstances, free to ignore. As set forth 
above, the incursion of the police into this protected area was already a violation of the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, even before anything else happened. Even if the 
patio was a place where the officer was entitled to be, however, what happened after he 
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got there compels the conclusion that his questioning of the defendant was an unwarranted 
"level two" detention as defined by Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, Ijl 1. 
A level two stop, which involves an investigative detention (however brief) is a 
Fourth Amendment seizure and requires that police have a reasonable suspicion to make 
that detention. A level two search occurs when "a reasonable person, in view of all the 
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave. This is true even if the 
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 
2000 UT App 55,1J11. 
The trial court found that, prior to arriving at the patio sliding glass door, Officer 
Lealaitafea was not possessed of sufficient information to support a "reasonable suspicion 
to detain defendant." (CT:85; Opinion, f^ 3, p. 5). Accordingly, the officer was only 
entitled to conduct a "level one" questioning of the defendant and was precluded from 
escalating the encounter to a "level two" detention. An investigating officer is entitled 
obtain evidence through a "level one" acceptance of a "knock and talk" invitation by a 
cooperating witness, but that acceptance must be voluntary and not coerced. If, taking 
the totality of the circumstances into account, the defendant was not reasonably free to 
decline to speak with the officer, then the detention escalated to an impermissible "level 
two" detention and all evidence derived from that unwarranted detention should be 
suppressed. See, State v. Alvey, 2007 UT App 161, ^f 4 and 5. 
In Alvey, the Court of Appeals concluded that, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, an encounter between the police and Alvey escalated to a level two seizure 
when, following a traffic stop, the sheriff instructed Alvey to stand in front of the police 
cruiser and remove his hands from his pockets. Under these circumstances, the Court 
concluded "we simply do not believe a reasonable person would feel free to leave once a 
police officer ordered him to move to a different location from where he was standing" 
and that based on the totality of the circumstances, "including the sheriffs use of 
authoritative language to instruct Alvey to move" the detention was escalated to a "level 
two" detention. Alvey, \ 5 (emphasis supplied). 
The facts in this case are virtually identical to the facts that led the court in Alvey to 
conclude that the encounter between the police and the defendant was an unwarranted 
"level two" detention. At the time of the encounter at issue in this case, the police 
officer was standing on a patio that could only be reached by leaving the public walkway 
and climbing up a hill. It was after 4 a.m. in the morning and defendant was wearing only 
his boxers and a shirt. The defendant, by attempting to hide behind a piece of furniture, 
clearly indicated that he that he did not wish to come to the door and speak with the 
officer. The uniformed officer, with holstered weapon clearly visible, did not ask the 
defendant if he was willing to answer some questions; rather, he used "authoritative 
language" and ordered the defendant to leave his position crouched behind the bed to 
"come and talk." Only after being ordered to do so by the officer did the defendant move 
from behind the bed where he was attempting to hide and came to the door. 
In reaching the conclusion that the interaction between the defendant and the 
officer was voluntary, the trial court did not apply the factors set forth in Ray and Alvey. 
A correct analysis of all the facts and circumstances in light of these controlling cases 
compels the conclusion that the interaction between the defendant and the officer was not 
voluntary. Under the totality of the circumstances - the hour, the location, the 
defendant's state of undress, his initial refusal to answer the door and the officer's 
authoritative language in ordering the defendant to come to the door and talk - a 
reasonable person would not believe that he had the option of refusing the order. The trial 
court conclusion that the evidence obtained by virtue of this illegal detention was, 
nonetheless, admissible was erroneous, and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment protects a semi-clad person, enjoying the sanctity of his 
own home, from being detained and questioned at four in the morning by a police officer 
who has suddenly appeared at a back door that cannot be accessed only by climbing up a 
bluff through deep snow. The Fourth Amendment also prevents the questioning of a 
person who has initially refused to speak with the police without a basis for a "level two" 
detention; that evidence did not exist in this case until after the defendant came to the door 
in response to the officer's command. 
The trial court erred in determining that the encounter was voluntary and the 
evidence obtained through the encounter, admissible. This error compels an reversal of 
the denial of the motion to suppress. Without the illegally obtained evidence, the state 
had no basis to charge the defendant with driving under the influence and the jury had no 
basis to convict, so reversal of the denial of the suppression motion should also result in 
vacating jury verdict and conviction. 




Attorney for Appellant Travis Perkins 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL 
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of January, 2009, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT TRAVIS PERKINS was placed in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Joy Natale 
Summit County Attorney 
6300 North Silver Creek Drive 
Park City, UT 84098 
DATED this 22rd day of January, 2009. 
ADDENDUM 
DAVID R. BRICKEY, #6188 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Justice Center 
6300 North Silver Creek Drive 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Telephone (435) 615-3828 
Facsimile (435) 615-3833 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
in and for SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
PLAINTIFF : 
VS. : CRIMINAL NO. 071500347 
TRAVIS JAMES PERKINS, : 
D.O.B. 02-04-85 Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
DEFENDANT. 
On the 20th day of October, 2008, appeared Joy Natale, Prosecuting Attorney, attorney for 
the State of Utah, and the defendant appeared in person with counsel, Blake Nakamura. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted upon a plea of guilty of the 
offense of DUI, a Third Degree Felony. The court having asked if the defendant had anything 
to say why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being 
shown or appearing to the court, 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined at the Utah State Prison for a period of 
zero to five years and is fined $3,000.00 plus an 85 % surcharge, as provided by law for the crime 
RECEIVED 
OCT 2 2 2008 
of DUI, a Third Degree Felony. 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant is granted a stay of execution of the above sentence 
and the defendant is placed on probation with Adult Probation and Parole for a period of thirty-six 
(36) months under the following conditions: 
1. That defendant maintain good behavior and have no violations of any laws; 
2. That the defendant serve sixty-two and one-half (62 V2) days in the Summit County 
Jail forthwith; 
3. That the defendant report to Adult Probation and Parole within twenty-four (24) 
hours of his release from jail; 
4. That the defendant not use or possess alcohol or frequent places where alcohol is 
the chief item of order; 
5. That the defendant not work at Harry O's unless approval is obtained from Adult 
Probation and Parole; 
6. That the defendant enter into a substance abuse evaluation and complete any 
treatment deemed necessary; 
7. That the defendant enter into and successfully complete medical and mental health 
evaluation and follow through with any recommended treatment deemed necessary 
by Adult Probation and Parole; 
8. That the defendant pay a fine in the amount of $ 1,500.00 at a rate to be determined 
by Adult Probation and Parole; 
9. That the defendant install an ignition interlock device on any vehicle owned or 
operated by the defendant; 
10. That the defendant submit to alcohol testing at the request of Adult Probation and 
Parole; 
11. That the defendant submit to random searches at the request of Adult Probation and 
Parole; 
12. That the defendant maintain full-time employment or vocational training; 
13. That the defendant not drive a motor vehicle without a valid license or insurance 
or with any alcohol in his system. 
DATED this day of October, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
Bruce C. Lubeck 
Third District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
o$y I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this 
£A0 day of October, 2008, to the following: 
Blake Nakamura 
142 East 200 South, Suite 312 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
TRAVIS JAMES PERKINS, 
Defendant, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 071500347 
Honorable BRUCE C. 
MAY 05 2008 
DATE: May 1, 2008 
The above matter came before the court for decision an 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
BACKGROUND 
An information was filed on December 13, 2007, charging 
defendant with felony driving under the influence of alcohol, and 
misdemeanor offenses of driving in violation of an alcohol 
restricted license and without an interlock device. After being 
bound over after a preliminary hearing held February 12, 2008, 
defendant filed a motion to suppress on March 10, 2008. An 
evidentiary hearing was held March 31, 2008. 
The court heard evidence and took the matter under 
advisement, and allowed the parties to file further memoranda. 
The State filed its response April 16, 2008. Defendant filed a 
reply April 28, 2008. Oral argument was held April 28, 2008 
before receipt of the reply of defendant. The court heard oral 
argument and took the issues under advisement to further consider 
the memoranda and the arguments. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In the early hours, about 3:50 a.m., of December 12, 
2007, a Deer Valley Ski Resort Security Officer Muller (Muller) 
came across a vehicle evidently stuck in the snow on the side of 
a road in the Deer Valley area. Muller attempted to get the 
attention of the driver, identified as defendant, but had a 
difficult time doing so. After pulling up next to defendant who 
finally responded, Muller saw defendant attempt to drive out of 
the snow but he was unable to do so. Muller spoke with defendant 
and detected defendant was intoxicated in Muller's opinion, as 
his speech was slurred and "muddled." 
2. Muller called the police and told them there was an 
intoxicated driver stuck and gave the location. As Muller was on 
the phone with the police defendant walked away from his vehicle 
and toward a parking structure nearby. Muller observed that and 
told dispatch the driver was intoxicated and was leaving the area 
on foot. 
3. Officers responded and Park City Police Department 
Officer Lealaitafea (Lealaitafea) arrived within 8 minutes of the 
dispatch. He found Muller and Muller described defendant as to 
clothing and size and such, and Muller told Lealaitafea where 
Muller had seen defendant go in the nearby parking structure. 
Muller explained to Lealaitafea what he, Muller, had seen 
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defendant do in the vehicle and how defendant appeared. 
4. Lealaitafea went into the parking structure and saw 
footprints leading through the snow from that parking structure. 
Lealaitafea followed those foot prints across the snow, the only 
set of prints leading from the area, to a condominium in the 
area. From the patio area Lealaitafea could see into the condo 
unit through a sliding glass door as the curtains were open. As 
Lealaitafea approached the sliding glass door he could see 
defendant inside the condo. Defendant matched the description 
Muller had given, and defendant as he saw Lealaitafea was 
attempting to hide behind a bed. 
5. Lealaitafea knocked on the glass door and motioned for 
defendant to come to the door and defendant did so, wearing boxer 
shorts and a shirt. No one else was visible in the room. 
Defendant opened the door and Lealaitafea could smell a strong 
odor of alcohol from defendant, saw defendant's eyes were red and 
glassy, and heard defendant's speech which was slurred. 
6. Lealaitafea asked, while he was still outside and 
defendant inside, what kind of car defendant had and where 
defendant's car was and defendant said it was stuck in the snow 
and he had driven it there. Defendant said he had a Subaru, which 
was consistent with the vehicle Lealaitafea had seen stuck in the 
snow. The ground was covered in snow and Lealaitafea was in an 
area that was not enclosed by any fences or structures, evidently 
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the back sliding glass door of a condo unit. Lealaitafea then 
asked defendant if he could come in and defendant said yes. 
Lealaitafea saw a pair of pants and shoes covered in snow on the 
floor. Lealaitafea asked defendant to get dressed and defendant 
put on the snow covered shoes and pants and went outside with 
Lealaitafea. Lealaitafea asked defendant if he could come 
outside. While it was not expressed, the purpose of that request 
was to see if Muller could identify defendant. The officer and 
defendant walked outside to the parking structure and there 
Muller identified defendant as the person he had seen in the car 
trying to remove it from being stuck in the snow. Lealaitafea 
then had defendant perform field sobriety tests and defendant was 
arrested based on the result of those tests. This was at 4:22 am 
and Lealaitafea had been called at 3:51 a.m. and arrived at the 
scene at 3:59 a.m. 
Defendant moves to suppress "any and all evidence acquired 
by the State." There was allegedly insufficient evidence to 
detain defendant and the plain view observations of defendant 
were from a place he was not permitted to lawfully be. 
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DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Muller was a reliable source of information. He gave his 
name, he was not otherwise interested, and he remained to meet 
with the officers and gave sufficient detail which was in fact 
corroborated. The officer saw the vehicle stuck in the snow and 
that corroborated what Muller had told dispatch then the officer 
when he arrived. 
2. Lealaitafea, when he approached the sliding glass door, 
was not in a private, enclosed area. It was snow covered ground 
in December, alleged to be a patio, but there was no evidence 
that it was in any way private. It was the back of a condo 
building. There were no visible paths, markings, signs, or 
anything else that forbade Lealaitafea from approaching the 
sliding glass door. 
3. At that point Lealaitafea had information a person had 
been driving while intoxicated. That information was from a 
reliable citizen-informant, who had given information 
corroborated by Lealaitafea when he saw the vehicle stuck in the 
snow. The informant, Muller, remained and talked with 
Lealaitafea and told Lealaitafea what he had seen. Muller gave 
detail as to physical description and where Muller had seen 
defendant go. That information did not amount to reasonable 
suspicion to detain defendant, however. 
4. When Lealaitafea approached the sliding glass door he saw 
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through the sliding glass door and open curtains a person 
matching the description given by Muller. He motioned for the 
person to come to the door and the person, defendant, tried to 
crouch down and hide behind a bed. When defendant did approach 
and open the sliding glass door, Lealaitafea remained outside. 
Lealaitafea saw defendant and formed the opinion he was in fact 
intoxicated, based on the slurred speech, glassy eyes, and strong 
odor of alcohol coming from defendant. The encounter was indeed 
and in fact a consensual encounter. Objectively defendant was 
free to tell the officer to go away, defendant could have refused 
to speak with the officer. While it does not matter, Lealaitafea 
testified if defendant would not have talked to him, Lealaitafea 
would have had to walk away. That is correct and while the 
officer's subjective belief does not enter into the equation, the 
officer was correct. Lealaitafea had some information before 
speaking with defendant, but not enough to amount to reasonable 
suspicion to justify a detention of defendant. However, once 
defendant spoke with Lealaitafea, the officer had then gained 
sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain defendant when combined 
with the previous information and all Lealaitafea had observed. 
After observing that in fact defendant, who matched the 
description and was hiding, was intoxicated and admitted he had 
driven his car (again matching what Lealaitafea had been told and 
had seen), Lealaitafea had sufficient reasonable suspicion to 
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detain defendant temporarily. Defendant argues he has a 
heightened expectation of privacy and that consensual encounters 
must occur in public. The court disagrees. Defendant indeed 
could have told the officer to leave, that defendant did not want 
to talk to Lealaitafea. A reasonable person would not feel they 
must answer the door or that they must talk to an officer in 
their own home. No level of suspicion is needed for an officer to 
approach a home and ask to talk to the resident. Lealaitafea 
needed no level of suspicion to ask defendant to speak with him. 
The resident is free to decline or accept, that is, consent to 
talk. There is no indication here that the officer used any 
coercion or force to get defendant to speak with him. Defendant 
later invited Lealaitafea in when the officer asked if he could 
come in. Defendant was not wearing pants and it was a reasonable 
request to have defendant put pants on. 
5. Asking defendant to come outside was clearly a detention 
requiring reasonable suspicion. Lealaitafea had such at that 
point based on what he had been told by a reliable citizen-
informant Muller, what had been corroborated by Lealaitafea's own 
observations and what defendant himself had stated to 
Lealaitafea. 
6. In combination and totality, those facts Lealaitafea was 
aware of amounted to reasonable suspicion to further detain 
defendant; that is, ask defendant to come outside for a quick 
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investigative routine to see if defendant was in fact the person 
seen operating a vehicle. If the officer has reasonable suspicion 
based on the totality of the circumstances to temporarily detain 
a person, he must diligently pursue an investigation that is 
likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions while the defendant is 
detained. Here, the officer pursued the least intrusive 
investigation possible at that point and requested defendant to 
merely step outside to the parking structure where Muller was to 
see if Muller could identify him. That investigative technique 
was designed to either confirm or dispel the suspicion 
Laelaitafea had and it was accomplished quickly. After Muller 
identified defendant Lealaitafea administered field sobriety 
tests and arrested defendant based on probable cause arising from 
the results of those tests. 
The court DENIES the motion to suppress. 
As noted in court, the matter is set for a status conference 
May 19, 2008, at 8:30 a.m. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
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order is required. 
DATED this day of / / * \ AL(^£_, 2008. 
BRUCE C. 
DISTRICT CO' 
Case No: 071500347 
Date : May 01, 2008 
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